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DEMOGRAPHICS POLICY FORUM 
Europe's Population 
at a Turning Point 
Fertility is currently low in Europe for 
two reasons: first, women are delaying 
births to later ages [the tempo effect (6, 7)), 
and second, even after adjusting for this de-
lay, fertility is below the level necessary for 
each generation to replace itself fully (low 
adjusted fertility). Delayed childbearing 
does not affect the total number of children 
women have over the course of their lives, 
provided they do not forgo postponed births 
altogether. However, it reduces the number 
of children born during the period in which 
delay is occurring, which lowers birth rates 
in that period and contributes to the aging 
of the population. 
Wolfgang Lutz,* Brian C. O'Neill, Sergei Scherbov 
Europe has just entered a critical phase of its demographic evolution. Around the year 2000, the population began to 
generate "negative momentum": a tenden-
cy to decline owing to shrinking cohorts of 
young people that was brought on by low 
fertility (birthrate) over the past three 
decades. Currently, 
the effect of negative 
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small. However, each additional decade that 
fertility remains at its present low level will 
imply a further decline in the European 
Union (EU) of 25 to 40 million people, in 
the absence of offsetting effects from im-
migration or rising life expectancy. 
Governments in Europe are beginning to 
consider a range of policy options to ad-
dress the negative implications of popula-
tion decline and rapid aging (1, 2). Social 
policies and labor laws aimed at halting the 
further increase in the mean age of child-
bearing-which contributes to low fertili-
ty-have substantial scope for affecting fu-
ture demographic trends. They also have an 
additional health rationale because of the 
increasing health risks associated with 
childbearing in older women. 
Negative Momentum and Low Fertility 
Population momentum measures the ef-
fect of the current age structure on fu-
ture population growth (3, 4). A young 
population has positive momentum (a 
built-in tendency to grow). An older 
population can have negative momentum 
when low fertility leads to smaller num-
bers of children than of parents , locking 
in future decreases in the number of par-
ents and a tendency toward population 
decline. Momentum can be calculated by 
performing a hypothetical projection in 
which all forces for change in population 
size except age structure are removed (5). 
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Negative momentum: effect of 20 more 
years of low fertility on population size in 
the EU. Population of the 15 member coun-
tries of the EU if one assumes that fertility im-
mediately increases to replacement level and 
remains constant thereafter {black line) or that 
fertility remains at 1.5 {red line) or 1.8 {pink 
line) until 2020, when it rises to replacement 
leve l. 
We find that for the 15 member countries 
of the EU, low fertility brought the popu-
lation to the turning point from positive to 
negative momentum around the year 
2000. Currently, negative momentum is 
small (see figure , above); population even 
grows for I 5 years in our momentum pro-
jection before declining, because of the 
large numbers of people born during the 
baby boom of the I 960s. However, if the 
current fertility rate of around 1.5 births 
per woman persists until 2020, negative 
momentum will result in 88 million fewer 
people in 2 I 00, if one assumes constant 
mortality and no net migration . 
The population decline of 88 million 
resulting from 20 years of low fertility can 
be separated (Fig. I ) into contributions 
from the tempo effect and from low ad-
justed fertility. The tempo effect is as-
sumed to be 0.3 children per woman, 
roughly consistent with recent experience 
in I 0 EU countries for which data are 
available (8). Postponement of births may 
continue, because many social and eco-
nomic factors still favor later childbearing 
(9). Adjusted fertility is assumed to re-
main constant at 1.8. Given these assump-
tions, if increases in the mean age of child-
bearing were halted, the period fertility 
would rise from 1.5 to 1.8. Our simula-
tions show that, under these conditions, 
substantially Jess negative momentum is 
generated, and ultimate population size is 
only 49 million lower than today's. Thus, 
45% of the population decline caused by a 
birthrate of 1.5 over 20 more years can be 
attributed to the effect of the increasing 
age of childbearing women on birth rates. 
In general, we find that each decade of 
fertility at current levels leads to declines 
in ultimate population size of 25 to 40 
million, with the con-
EFFECTS OF LOW FERTILITY ON POPULATION IN EUROPE tribution of timing re-
maining around 40% 
or more in all cases 
(see table). We arrive 
at the same conclu-
Population decline 
by 2100 
Period of Continued No further 
low fertility delay (TFR 1.5) delay (TFR 1.8) 
(years) (millions) (millions) 
0 15 15 
10 55 34 
zo 88 49 
30 118 63 
40 144 77 
Contribution 
of delay 
(mllions) (%) 
0 0 
22 39 
39 45 
55 46 
67 46 
Negative momentum: effect of periods of low fertility on popula-
tion decline in Europe. The scenarios assume fertility {birthrate) re-
mains constant at 1.5 {continued delay case) or at 1.8 {no further de-
lay case) for the number of years noted in the first column before in-
stantly rising to replacement level. TFR, total fertility rate. 
sion when we assume 
that, instead of re-
maining constant, ad-
justed fertility contin-
ues to fall [(JO) , see 
supporting online ma-
terial]. The effect 
caused by increasing 
age of childbearing 
clearly deserves at-
tention not just in ad-
justments to fertility 
rates ( 6, 11), but also 
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4.5 
- No further delay 
sion, particularly if increasing la-
bor demand leads to substantial 
immigration from other cultures. 
Although population aging is the 
main focus of population-related 
social, economic, and political 
concerns in Europe, there is also 
a deeply rooted fear of popula-
tion decline (! 3) associated with 
a possible weakening of national 
identity and loss of international 
political and economic standing. 
4 .0 - 1 O years of delay 
- 20 years of delay 
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t:: 
0 
c. 
c. 
:::i 
en 
3.0 
2 .5 
2.0 
Year 
Policy discussions have pri-
marily focused on adjusting to 
given demographic trends, by 
Effect of further delays in childbearing on aging in the 
EU member states. 
making structural adjustments to 
pension systems, labor markets, 
when considering determinants of the fu-
ture size and age structure of Europe's 
population. 
Aging and Delayed Childbearing 
Continued increases in the mean age of 
childbearing will also have significant ef-
fects on the age distribution within the pop-
ulation . In the scenario simulating an im-
mediate halt to the delay in childbearing, 
the "support ratio" declines from about 
four working-age persons (ages I 5 to 64) 
per elderly person (age 65+) to consider-
ably less than three for most of the remain-
der of the century (see figure, above), if we 
assume 0 net migration and no changes in 
mortality. If the delay in childbearing con-
tinued with no change in adjusted fertility, 
the support ratio would further decline to 
almost 2, nearly doubling the demographic 
dependence burden as compared with the 
present. Twenty years of continued increas-
es in the mean age of childbearing imply an 
additional decline in the support ratio of 
about 0.5 workers per elderly person by 
2065, the year when the difference is most 
pronounced. The cumulative effects are 
substantial. Looked at from the perspective 
of the working-age population, continued 
delay of I 0 to 40 years will imply that an 
additional 500 to I 500 million person-
years of workers would be needed to sup-
port the elderly population over the rest of 
the century, as compared with a no-delay 
scenario. 
Policy Implications 
Over the coming decades , the decisive shift 
to an older age structure in Europe (12) 
will challenge social security and health 
systems, may hinder productivity gains, 
and could affect global competitiveness 
and economic growth. It could also strain 
relations among generations, particularly 
between those who are on the contributing 
and receiv ing ends of public transfer pro-
grams. It may also diminish social cohe-
and health and fiscal systems. 
With already very high tax rates, however, 
there is a limit to how much governments 
can squeeze out of a shrinking labor force . 
Hence, discussions are beginning to turn to 
policies that could influence demographic 
trends themselves. Because substantial in-
creases in immigration remain politically 
unpopular, fertility may increasingly be 
considered as a policy variable (14). 
Childbearing could come to be considered 
a "social act" (15 ) rather than a purely pri-
vate deci sion. 
In 1976, a set of policies was enacted in 
East Germany that included much im -
proved child-care facilities, financial bene-
fits , and government-supported housing if 
a woman became pregnant. As a conse-
quence, period fertility in East Germany, 
which had declined almost in parallel with 
West Germany, increased from 1.5 to 1.9 
(16). The mean age of childbearing stayed 
below 25 years, while it increased to more 
than 28 years in the West. In contemporary 
Western Europe, however, there is pro-
nounced public resistance to explicitly pro-
natalist policies. This is partly because of 
infamous birth promotion programs in past 
fascist regimes and partly because births 
are often viewed as an obstacle for women 
pursuing careers and therefore not some-
thing the government should promote as an 
end in itself. Family policies in Europe to-
day are based instead on an equal-opportu-
nities rationale and aim to help women 
combine child rearing with employment. 
Such policies seem to have had a small, if 
any, effect on period fertility (17). 
Policies that aim to affect the timing of 
births rather than family size may be more 
acceptable. Such policies would have to ad-
dress some of the prime reasons for contin-
ued childbearing delay, including inflexible 
higher education systems, youth unem-
ployment, housing markets, and especially 
career patterns built around traditional 
male life-course models. Revamping the 
conventional sequence of life course transi-
tions can also help solve conflicts between 
work and family (18). Health benefits may 
provide an additional rationale. A contin-
ued delay in childbearing has not only led 
to burgeoning numbers of infertil ity treat-
ments but also to increasing medical con-
cerns about health risks for mother and 
child associated with late pregnancies. 
Halting the trend toward higher mean 
ages of childbearing would significantly 
moderate population aging and decline in 
Europe. Changes in the timing of births 
have been pointed out as a possible avenue 
for slowing population growth in develop-
ing countries, in that case by encouraging 
delays in childbearing (19). Here, we are 
suggesting the reverse: that di scouraging 
further delays in childbearing could help 
confront the population-related challenge 
faced by Europe. 
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Methodology and Data Sources 
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Description of data sources. This analysis is carried out at the level of the European 
Union with its current 15 member states. The starting population for the year 2000 by 
sex and single year of age has been derived from the database of the European 
Demographic Observatory (ODE) through personal communication with Alain 
Confesson. These data also include fertility rates by single year of age and mortality 
rates by sex and single year of age. The ODE database is derived from basic data 
provided by European statistical offices as part of an international framework for data 
collection. 
Projection methods and assumptions. The alternative population projections were 
carried out using standard cohort component population projection methods using 
software developed by the authors. Since this analysis aims at isolating the impacts of 
alternative fertility assumptions, in all scenarios only the fertility component was 
modified as described in Table 1, while we assumed that mortality stayed constant at 
life expectancies of 81.5 years for women and 75.5 years for men. We also assumed a 
closed population without migration. 
Sensitivity to Assumptions on Future Quantum of Period Fertility 
Simulations presented in the main text are based on a hypothetical reference scenario 
in which it is assumed that the adjusted fertility- also called the quantum of period 
fertility - remains constant in the future at its current level of about 1.8. This simple 
scenario facilitates analysis of the implications of continued delays in childbearing for 
future population size and structure. However there are two aspects of our 
simulations to which results may be sensitive: the assumed magnitude of the tempo 
effect, and the possibility that the quantum of fertility may decline in the future. 
Declines in cohort fertility in recent decades suggest that the quantum of fertility 
could decline over the next few decades. To investigate the robustness of our 
conclusions regarding the importance of tempo effects to alternative assumptions 
about the quantum of fertility, we repeated our calculations for a reference scenario in 
which the quantum is assumed to decline from 1.8 in 2000 to 1.5 in 2020, a decline of 
0.15 per decade which is in the upper range of recent experience in many European 
countries. 
Results show that our main conclusions remain unchanged under this alternative 
scenario. Because period fertility is lower in these simulations than in the analogous 
scenarios presented in the main text, future population size is smaller and age 
structure is older. Figure 1 demonstrates that continued delays in childbearing, if one 
assumes declining quantum, contribute substantially to the generation of negative 
momentum by continued low fertility. For example, 20 years of further delay in 
childbearing is responsible for 37% of the population decline between 2000 and 2100 
(the analogous result for the constant quantum reference scenario in the main text is 
45% ). This result assumes, as in the calculations in the main text, that the tempo 
effect is constant at 0.3 children per woman. Figure 2 shows that childbearing delays 
also contribute substantially to changes in the support ratio. Twenty years of 
postponement of childbearing implies an additional decline in the support ratio of 
about 0.3 in 2065, the year when the difference is most pronounced. If delay 
continues for 40 years, the additional decline in the support ratio is 0.5. 
Lutz et al. , l 080316 
SOM, p. 2 
We also tested the robustness of our conclusions to the assumed magnitude of the 
tempo effect. We repeated our calculations assuming that the tempo effect remains 
constant at 0.2 births per woman, rather than 0.3 births per woman as assumed in the 
simulations reported in the main text. As reported in footnote 8 of the main text, the 
population-weighted average tempo effect based on 10 individual country calculations 
reported in Bongaarts (8, main text) is 0.33, for the period 1990-1997. Data are 
insufficient to estimate the tempo effect for the additional 5 EU countries. It is 
plausible that the inclusion of these countries, and of extending the period over more 
recent years, could produce a somewhat lower estimate of the average tempo effect in 
the EU over the past decade, since the increase in the mean age of childbearing is 
generally smaller over the past few years and in the countries which lack detailed 
fertility data. Since a precise estimate of the tempo effect is not possible, we use 0.2 
as a hypothetical scenario to test sensitivity. Our results show that outcomes change 
roughly in proportion to the change in the assumed tempo effect. That is, reducing the 
tempo effect by a third (from 0.3 to 0.2) reduces the contribution of delay to 
population decline, as reported in Table 1 of the main text, by about a third (e.g., from 
45% to 30% in the case of 20 years of further delay). Likewise, the implications of 
delay for the dependency burden is reduced by a third as well. 
Other scenarios, outside the scope of our analysis, are possible as well. 
Childbearing delays could be reversed rather than simply halting, causing the mean 
age of childbearing to decline. In addition, changes in the tempo of fertility could 
interact with the quantum. For example, it has been suggested that postponement of 
births can induce declines in quantum. We suggest that the reverse may be true as 
well: if births begin to shift to younger rather than older ages, this may induce an 
increase in the quantum. In this way the effect of policies influencing the tempo of 
fertility may be magnified through their indirect effects on the quantum. 
......._______ 
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Table Sl. Period fertility assumptions for all scenarios in main text and supplementary material. Fertility is interpolated linearly between 
values shown in the table, and remains constant beyond 2050. Scenarios 1, 9, and 13 appear in Fig. 1; scenarios 1and8-15 are used to construct 
Table 1; scenarios 2 and 4-7 appear in Fig. 2; scenarios 1, 9, 13, 20 and 21 appear in Fig. Sl; scenarios 2, 16, 17, and 19 appear in Fig. S2 . 
Scenario Nr. Name 2000 2001 2010 2011 2020 2021 2030 2031 2040 2041 2050 
l Instant replacement level 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
2Constant quantum, no further delay 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
3Constant quantum, continued delay 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
4Constant quantum, 10 years further delay 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
5Constant quantum, 20 years further delay 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
6Constant quantum, 30 years further delay 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
?Constant quantum, 40 years further delay 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 
8Scenario 3 +replacement level in 2011 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
9Scenario 3 +replacement level in 2021 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
lOScenario 3 + replacement level in 2031 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
11 Scenario 3 + replacement level in 2041 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.06 2.06 
12Scenario 2 +replacement level in 2011 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
13Scenario 2 +replacement level in 2021 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
14Scenario 2 +replacement level in 2031 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
15Scenario 2 +replacement level in 2041 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.06 2.06 
16Declining quantum, no further delay 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
17 Declining quantum, 20 years further delay 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
18Declining quantum, 30 years further delay !:~Interpolated 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 19Declining quantum, 40 years further delay 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 
20Scenario 17 +replacement level in 2021 1.5 1.2 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
21Scenario16 +replacement level in 2021 1.8 1.5 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
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Fig. Sl. Effect of 20 more yea.rs of low fertility on population size, if one assumes 
declining quantum of period fertility. Population of the EU-15 if one assumes fertility 
immediately increases to replacement level and remains constant thereafter (black 
line), and if one assumes fertility declines linearly from 1.5 to 1.2 (dark green line) or 
1.8 to 1.5 (bright green line) in 2020 when it rises to replacement level. For 
comparison, dotted pink and red lines show results from Fig. 1 in the main text, if one 
assumes constant quantum of period fertility [fertility remains at 1.5 (red line) or 1.8 
(pink line) until 2020 when it rises to replacement level]. Mortality is held constant 
and migration is set to zero in all cases. 
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Fig. S2. Effect of further delays in childbearing on aging, if one assumes declining 
quantum of period fertility. Support ratio in the EU-15, if one assumes zero to four 
decades of further delay, with mortality held constant and no migration. For 
comparison, the dotted black line shows results from Fig. 2 in the main text and is 
based on the assumptions of constant quantum of period fertility and no further delay 
in childbearing. 
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